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RESPONSE 
 
COMMUNICATIONS, TECHNOLOGY,  
AND PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS  
SUSAN W. BRENNER† 
In response to Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future 
of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (2012). 
INTRODUCTION 
I was honored to be asked to respond to Professor Bellin’s insightful 
article, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impres-
sions.1  Since I agree with much of what he says, my Response is limited 
to two tasks:  parsing the relationship between modes of communica-
tion and the present sense impression exception, and assessing the ex-
tent to which at least certain types of electronic communication might 
be incorporated into the percipient witness requirement he proposes.   
I.  MODES OF COMMUNICATION 
In the introduction to his article, Professor Bellin states that the 
present sense impression exception to the default rule barring hearsay 
“is uniquely tethered to an oral . . . communication norm.”2  He also 
notes that advocates of the exception assumed “that people would on-
ly communicate about unfolding events orally.”3   
 
† NCR Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton School 
of Law.  Email:  susanwbrenner@yahoo.com. 
1 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331 (2012).  
2 Id. at 333. 
3 Id.  
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Professor Bellin argues that this assumption was, and is, an integral, 
essential component of the rationale for recognizing the present sense 
impression exception, because in an era of only oral communication, 
“a person who uttered a statement about an unfolding event . . . would 
invariably be speaking to someone nearby who was also able to observe 
the same event.”4  He notes that the supporters of the exception con-
tended that from this once-inevitable empirical circumstance, one 
could derive “two separate guarantors of reliability”—
contemporaneity and corroboration.5  I will assume, for the purposes 
of this analysis, that their contention was correct, i.e., that contempo-
raneity and corroboration are useful in ensuring the reliability of 
statements offered as present sense impressions.  
However, I take issue with Professor Bellin’s comments insofar as 
they assume we can only derive these guarantors of reliability from 
oral communications.  As I noted above, he argues that the present 
sense impression exception is “uniquely tethered to an oral” commu-
nication norm.6  I disagree.   
It is one thing to point out that because the exception originated 
in a world in which oral statements were the only way people could 
communicate spontaneously about contemporaneous events,7 it is ap-
propriate in that context.  It is another to suggest that the exception is 
only appropriate in that context.  I would argue that the fact that the 
exception is a product of proximate oral communication does not nec-
essarily mean that it is limited to that type of communication.   
 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 375. 
6 Id. at 333 (emphasis added).   
7 For the evolution of the present sense impression exception, see, for example, 
Edward M. Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Excep-
tion:  A Relapse in Hearsay Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 326-30 (2009).  In the era in which 
the exception was evolving, people could communicate in writing, as well as orally, but 
writing tended to be used for formal communication, e.g., for correspondence or for 
news stories.  Cf. Bellin, supra note 1, at 333-34.  Prior to the rise of cyberspace, it was 
not common for average citizens to carry writing materials in order to jot down stray 
thoughts or document what they were“currently seeing, doing, and feeling.”  Id. at 335.  
That, of course, has changed dramatically, as one court noted,  
given the ubiquity of communications in electronic media (e-mail, text mes-
sages, chat rooms, internet postings on servers like “myspace” or “youtube” or 
on blogs, . . . etc.), it is not surprising that many statements involving observa-
tions of events surrounding us, statements regarding how we feel, our plans 
and motives, and our feelings (emotional and physical) will be communicated 
in electronic medium. 
Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 568-69 (D. Md. 2007). 
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But that seems to be the premise of Professor Bellin’s article:  he 
appears to believe that the present sense impression exception and 
electronic communications are necessarily incompatible, apparently 
because he believes electronic communications cannot sustain the 
guarantors of reliability (contemporaneity and corroboration) that are 
associated with oral communications.  I agree that electronic commu-
nications can fail to sustain either or both guarantors of reliability, but 
I do not agree that such failure is inevitable in either or both respects.    
I think it is better to analyze the potential for failure discretely by 
dividing electronic communications into categories—tweets, texts, 
emails, Facebook status updates, and so forth—and analyzing the ex-
tent to which communications in each category have the potential to 
sustain the guarantors of reliability we have long assumed are associat-
ed with oral communications.  As to the actual reliability of the latter 
part of this analysis, Professor Bellin notes that declarants could fabri-
cate oral observations by communicating them directly to others, re-
cording them on a dedicated recording device, or leaving them on a 
voicemail system.8  But he dismisses the risk of unreliability in this con-
text, concluding that the “facial absurdity” of orally fabricating such 
evidence would render it “of little value.”9 
There are, however, reported cases that involve the fabrication of 
just such evidence.10  This, along with the fact that different types of 
electronic communication may vary in the extent to which they can 
support the guarantors of reliability Professor Bellin attributes to 
oral communications, suggests that the two are not unitary con-
structs, i.e., that one is inherently likely to be reliable while the other 
is inherently likely not to be reliable.  
Since this Response is brief, I have neither the space nor the ambi-
tion to engage in a detailed analysis of the comparative reliability of 
oral versus electronically mediated communications.  But before I 
leave this issue, I would like to comment on two other points.  
 
 
8 See Bellin, supra note 1, at 362-63.     
9 Id. at 363.  
10 This commonly arises with fabricated 911 calls.  See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 
No. 09-6046, 2011 WL 4829718, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2011); People v. Roche, 772 
N.E.2d 1133, 1138-39 (N.Y. 2002); People v. Dalton, 629 N.Y.S.2d 86, 86 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1995).  It is reasonable to assume that these are the exceptions, i.e., that there are oth-
er reported and unreported cases in which the fabrication of oral evidence did not 
come to light.  
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A.  “Mischievous Evidence” 
 In his introduction, Professor Bellin cites Twitter and Facebook’s 
status updates as examples of electronic communication modalities 
that are likely to be the source of “mischievous evidence,”11 a point he 
returns to in a later section of his article.  In the later section, he em-
phasizes the ease with which electronic communications can be used 
to fabricate present sense impression evidence.12  He argues, first, that 
the (presumed) “absence of other observers” makes it “more likely” that 
someone will generate a “false or misleading statement,” and attributes 
the lack of observers to the fact that Twitter and other electronic com-
munication media “physically distanc[e] the speaker” from others.13  
Electronic communication media do tend to distance us physically 
from those with whom we communicate; a spatial disconnect is com-
mon, but not inevitable.14  However, this distance is not necessarily an 
engine of fabrication.  Courts have held, for example, that 911 emer-
gency calls can qualify as a present sense impression.15  In other words, 
some courts have found that a physical disconnect between the party 
who initiates oral communication and the party who receives such 
communication is not a necessary indicator of fabrication.  Indeed, 
these courts tended to consider the time in which the caller had to 
fabricate a story as the critical issue in determining whether the call 
qualified under the present sense impression exception.16 
 
11 Bellin, supra note 1, at 334-35. 
12 See id. at 362-66.  
13 Id. at 362.  
14 Conference attendees, law students, and others in similar situations, for example, 
have been known to use texts, emails, tweets, and other electronic means to communi-
cate with each other even though they simultaneously occupy the same physical space. 
15 See, e.g., United States v. Boyce, No. 10-0533, 2011 WL 5078186, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Oct. 26, 2011); United States v. Campbell, 782 F. Supp. 1258, 1260-61 (N.D. Ill. 1991); 
People v. Crow, No. 293645, 2010 WL 4628685, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2010); 
People v. Spencer, 928 N.Y.S.2d 607, 607 (App. Div. 2011); Wilder v. Commonwealth, 
687 S.E.2d 542, 546 (Va. Ct. App. 2010); State v. Seals, No. 63883-1-I, 2011 WL 1226896, 
at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2011).  But see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
16 Compare Campbell, 782 F. Supp. at 1260-61 (concluding that a call qualified as a 
present sense impression because the caller did not have time to fabricate a story), with 
People v. Dalton, 629 N.Y.S.2d 86, 86 (App. Div. 1995) (indicating that the record 
showed the caller had time to “‘possibly fabricate’” a story (quoting People v. Wilson, 
506 N.Y.S.2d 760, 760 (1986))).  According to one source, an empirical study shows 
that “the truth took longer to get out than a previously conceived lie, and . . . a lie fab-
ricated on the spur of the moment required less than three seconds to create and ut-
ter.”  Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 907, 917 (2001) (citing John O. Greene et al., Planning and Control of Behav-
ior During Deception, 11 HUM. COMM. RES. 335, 350-59 (1985)).   
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And that brings us back to whether, for the purposes of this analy-
sis, there is a legitimate distinction between oral and electronic com-
munications.  It might be easier to fabricate a textual communication 
than an oral communication, but unless and until we have evidence 
that clearly supports this proposition, it necessarily remains in the 
realm of speculation.  For now, it seems reasonable to assume (or, 
perhaps more accurately, to continue to assume) that some observers 
will be inclined to fabricate statements and will utilize whatever means 
are at their disposal to achieve this end.  The mere possibility of fabri-
cation is not, I submit, enough to warrant imposing excessive re-
strictions on the use of electronically generated statements.  That 
solution would be overinclusive, in that it could deny courts access to 
reliable evidence.  The appropriate response is to utilize counter-
measures, such as corroboration, that provide some assurance of the 
integrity of a declarant’s statements.17 
B.  Fabricating, Spinning, and Puffing 
Professor Bellin also notes that “[i]ntentionally false statements 
are only part of the problem.”18  He expresses concern about people 
 
Electronic communications tend to increase the speed with which we communi-
cate, but it is difficult to see how this circumstance alone undermines the integrity of 
the present sense impression exception.  As courts have noted, a pivotal inquiry in 
determining the applicability of that exception is not the speed with which the lie trav-
els, but instead our presumptive ability to fabricate the lie in the time that elapses be-
tween our observing the event at issue and the communication of our “sense 
impression” to others.  See, e.g., United States v. Green, 556 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 
2009) (noting that “the fundamental premise behind the present-sense impression 
exception” is “that contemporaneity ensures reliability because there is no time for 
deliberate fabrication”).  See generally McFarland, supra, at 917 (finding that it took, on 
average, 2.967 seconds to create a “spontaneous lie”).  One could, therefore, argue 
that insofar as electronic communications increase the speed with which we communi-
cate, they reinforce the reliability of the present sense impression.  But see Bellin, supra 
note 1, at 335-37 (noting limitations of contemporaneity as a guarantor of reliability).   
The increased speed with which electronic communications travel also inferentially 
supports the reliability of recorded present sense impressions since it ensures that 
there is less of a gap between observation and communication of one’s impressions of 
what one observed.  James Bradley Thayer, who is perhaps the original champion of 
the exception, supported it because he believed the temporal proximity between event 
and declaration eliminated “any substantial concern about the quality of the declar-
ant’s memory.”  Imwinkelried, supra note 7, at 327.  
17 Because the possibility of fabrication in this context substantially preexists the 
rise of electronic communication media, many courts have “read the [present sense 
impression] exception to require such corroboration.”  United States v. McElroy, 587 
F.3d 73, 85 n.13 (1st Cir. 2009).   
18 Bellin, supra note 1, at 364. 
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(1) intentionally fabricating evidence in anticipation of litigation 
and/or (2) exaggerating, “spin[ning],” or engaging in “puffery” in 
their “postings on a social networking site.”19  His concern here is 
that if “declarants take creative license with the truth in electronic 
postings, their misleading assertions will be difficult to untangle 
from the electronic record itself.”20 
My response to his first area of concern, i.e., prospective litigants 
fabricating evidence designed to support their position, is that this is 
nothing new.  Prosecutions for attempts to obstruct justice by falsifying 
or fabricating evidence are far from unusual in our court systems.21  
While it would be naïve to assume that the authorities detect and 
prosecute all such attempts, it can be extraordinarily difficult to suc-
ceed in such an endeavor.  Computer forensic analysts can ascertain 
when, how, and by whom evidence was created, which can often reveal 
the evidence’s true character; even if the evidence withstands such 
scrutiny, other evidence presented at trial will often reveal that it is 
inconsistent with the known facts and therefore fabricated.22  In other 
words, it is one thing to fabricate evidence, but quite another to suc-
cessfully utilize it to one’s advantage.   
I am somewhat puzzled by Professor Bellin’s articulated concern 
about exaggeration, spinning, and puffery in postings on social net-
working sites.  One of the sources he cites for this proposition notes 
(quite accurately, from what I know) that adolescents commonly blur 
“lines between fact and fiction” in their postings on Facebook and 
other sites.23  My immediate reaction to that observation was that it 
understates the phenomenon, i.e., I do not believe it is only adoles-
cents who blur the lines between “fact and fiction” in their postings on 
social networking sites.  While I suspect people tend to be “reasonably” 
accurate in the personal information they post on such sites, they are, 
after all, “social” networking sites.   
As such, it seems reasonable to put about as much credence into 
postings from those with whom you are not personally acquainted as 
you would into comments from someone you met at a bar or a party 
 
19 Id. at 363.  
20 Id. at 364.  
21 See, e.g., United States v. Thorson, 633 F.3d 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
the sentence of a defendant who falsified, fabricated, and produced documents during 
an Internal Revenue Service audit and a grand jury investigation). 
22 See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 13, Thorson, 633 F.3d 312 (No. 07-4787) (providing 
results of forensic computer analysis as evidence of guilt).   
23 Bellin, supra note 1, at 363 n.116 (citing Katie Roiphe, The Language of Fakebook, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at 2ST).  
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or any other event that brought together people with no preexisting 
connections.  I, for one, do not see how the proliferation of online 
postings from those who choose to frequent social networking sites 
has any particular empirical relevance for the application of the pre-
sent sense impression exception, aside from creating a mass of data to 
which it may, or may not, apply.   
 
*      *      * 
 
I could, perhaps, comment further on particular aspects of Profes-
sor Bellin’s views on how and why the rise of electronic communica-
tion media has the potential to have a negative impact on the 
application of the present sense impression exception to the default 
rule barring hearsay.  I assume—and I hope—that is not necessary.  
I hope that I have made my point:  electronic communication media 
certainly create new opportunities for statements that may be offered into 
evidence under the present sense impression exception.  That is only to 
be expected, since we have already dealt with one such opportunity.   
As Professor Bellin explains at the beginning of his article, the early 
proponents of the exception assumed it would apply (only) to state-
ments made to “someone nearby who was also able to observe the same 
event.”24  But it soon became apparent that it could also apply to com-
ments communicated over the telephone, a circumstance courts even-
tually integrated into the exception.25  We therefore have experience in 
adapting the present sense impression exception to the realities created 
by emerging technologies.  I suspect we will have little difficulty adapt-
ing the exception so that it can accommodate our use of social network-
ing and whatever communication technologies evolve in the future.  
II.  PERCIPIENT WITNESS 
Professor Bellin ultimately concludes that two approaches can be 
used to limit the admissibility of “uncorroborated” statements trans-
 
24 Id. at 333.  
25 Compare Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 494 A.2d 426, 434-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(concluding that the victim’s statements made in a phone call to the police dispatcher 
describing his victimization were inadmissible under the present sense exception be-
cause they were not made in the presence of another person), with State v. Essa, 955 
N.E.2d 429, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011) (determining that a statement the defendant’s 
wife made in a phone conversation with her friend just before she died was admissible 
under the present sense impression exception).  
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mitted via electronic technology.26  One would require “corroboration, 
in any form, of the substance of the statement”; the other, “narrower 
approach would require corroboration in a specific form—a percipi-
ent witness.”27  He opts for the narrower approach, essentially because 
he finds the broader approach’s reliance “on judges to make ad hoc 
assessments” as to the reliability of corroborated statements offered 
under the exception “unsatisfying.”28   
I tend to agree with Professor Bellin’s views on the importance of 
corroboration.  While I believe, as I explained above, we can incorpo-
rate the use of electronic communication technology into the present 
sense impression, I, too, am concerned about the possibility of opening 
trials up to potentially unreliable evidence.  I think corroboration is the 
obvious way to address this concern.  I am not sure whether I share Pro-
fessor Bellin’s reservations about the broader approach to achieving 
corroboration, but for the initial purposes of this analysis, I will accept 
his views and only address the position for which he advocates.   
That position—the narrower approach—“requires statements admit-
ted as present sense impressions to be communicated at trial by a per-
cipient witness (i.e., someone who was present at the time the statement 
was made) who ‘received’ (or made) the statement.”29  I can see the 
possible utility of this requirement, but I am unable to evaluate its 
specific utility in the present context because Professor Bellin does 
not define what it means for the witness to be “present” at the time 
the statement was made.  “Presence” was an implicit, assumed ele-
ment of the present sense impression exception when it was first de-
veloped because, as I noted earlier, it assumed face-to-face 
communication between two people. 
 Electronic communication moves us far beyond traditional 
face-to-face communication, at least in the spatial sense.  For that rea-
son, I assume Professor Bellin would not limit the applicability of this 
narrower approach to instances in which the “speaker” and “recipient” 
were physically proximate.   To include such a limitation would take us 
 
26 Bellin, supra note 1, at 366.  Professor Bellin is concerned about the fact that, 
while those who lobbied for the adoption of the exception assumed that statements 
offered under the exception would be corroborated by testimony from a “percipient 
witness,” the latter requirement “no longer applies to a large subset of present sense im-
pressions.”  Id. at 361.  For the definition of percipient witness, see infra text accompany-
ing note 29.  The two approaches he refers to are designed to restore this requirement.  
See Bellin, supra note 1, at 366-74 (describing how the “corroboration” and “percipient 
witness” approaches impose checks on the admissibility of present sense impressions).  
27 Bellin, supra note 1, at 366.  
28 Id. at 367. 
29 Id. at 370. 
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back to where we started—doing nothing to integrate electronically 
transmitted communications involving two or more nonphysically 
proximate people into the present sense impression exception. 
I wonder if Professor Bellin would be willing to modify the tradition-
al definition of “presence” so that it could also accommodate a concept 
of “electronic” presence?  I wonder that because as I read his article, a 
scenario occurred to me that incorporates the concept of “electronic” 
presence and seems to address the concerns Professor Bellin notes with 
regard to the admission of uncorroborated electronic communications. 
Assume a version of events that occurred recently in the metropoli-
tan area in which I live:30  A young man and a young woman are sitting 
in their car at an intersection waiting for a red light to change when 
John Doe, driving at a very high rate, crashes into their car.  Both are 
killed instantly.  Assume, further, that the incident occurred at 6:30 p.m. 
on a Friday, when the nearby sidewalks were full of pedestrians who 
were circulating between bars or on their way to nearby restaurants.   
Assume, even further, that many of the pedestrians observed the 
collision.  While some called 911, others immediately began tweeting 
and texting about what they had just seen.  The driver of the car later 
is charged with reckless driving and negligent homicide.  The prose-
cutor would like to introduce some of the pedestrians’ tweets and texts 
at trial under the present sense impression exception.   
All of these people were clearly present when the accident hap-
pened.  Does that mean they or, more properly, their texts and tweets 
satisfy the requirements Professor Bellin would impose on the admis-
sibility of such evidence?  Who would be the percipient witness(es)?  
Would those who read the tweets and texts qualify as such a witness?  
Should they be considered to have been “present” when the statement 
was made?  And how does their being “present” at that place and on 
that occasion (assuming we can apply these concepts in this context) 
enhance the credibility of their testimony?  All they really know is that 
they read one or more electronic communications that purported to 
describe accurately the accident and its aftermath. 
I do not know the answers to those questions.  I raise this scenario 
because I think it illustrates another way electronic communications can 
satisfy the corroboration requirement Professor Bellin (and I) see as es-
sential to applying the present sense impression exception in this context.   
It seems reasonable to me to treat the authors of our hypothetical 
tweets and texts as percipient witnesses whose electronic communica-
 
30 See Doug Page, Man Charged in Fatal Crash; Students at Carroll, CJ Mourning the 
Deaths of 2 Young Friends, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Nov. 22, 2011, at B1.   
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tions inferentially corroborate each other.  Some courts have taken 
this approach with 911 calls.  In State v. Naugler, an Ohio court found 
that 911 calls from two independent callers reporting that the driver 
of a “gold Saturn automobile with Pennsylvania license plates,” which 
was “traveling eastbound on Interstate 70,” was pointing either a gun 
or “his finger as if it were a gun” in the direction of other motorists.31  
At the driver’s trial for carrying a concealed weapon, the prosecutor 
sought to introduce these statements, but the driver’s attorney object-
ed that they were hearsay.32  The Ohio Court of Appeals held that the 
calls were properly admitted because the callers were describing an 
event as they perceived it and because the statements corroborated 
each other, i.e., they came from two independent callers, one from 
Texas and one from Arizona, each of whom accurately described the 
vehicle and its license plate number accurately to within one digit.33  
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.34 
I offer this suggestion because I have, for well over a decade, de-
voted much of my time to researching and writing about how our use 
of cyberspace sometimes requires us to modify existing legal rules 
but often does not.  As I explain when I speak and write on this topic, 
law—except for specialized areas such as patent and copyright—is 
concerned with people, not with technology, as such.  Given that, I 
believe we need to be careful not to overestimate the impact tech-
nology has on existing law; in many instances, it may be possible to 
accommodate uses of technology with rules as they exist or by tweak-
ing them only slightly. 
Here, it seems to me that our legal system has an opportunity to 
take advantage of the tremendous amount of data our use of social 
networking technology creates.  Much of this data is worthless as far as 
the law of evidence is concerned, but it can also create scenarios, like 
the one outlined above, in which we have the recorded coincident 
reactions of people who fortuitously observed the same event.  It 
seems to me that such data offers a new source of evidence and a new 
 
31 No. CA2004-09-003, 2005 WL 3148081, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2005), aff’d, 
855 N.E.2d 456 (Ohio 2006).   
32 Id. at *3. 
33 Id. at *4. 
34 See, e.g., Miller v. Crown Amusements, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 703, 706-07 (S.D. Ga. 
1993) (admitting present sense impressions where one known 911 caller and one un-
known 911 caller made nearly identical statements shortly after an accident); Wooten v. 
Newcon Transp., Inc., 632 S.E.2d 525, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (admitting present 
sense impressions where two unknown 911 callers made nearly identical statements 
shortly after an accident).  
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way to validate the reliability of that evidence:  if we find consistency in 
the independent, coincident tweets or texts of people who were react-
ing to the same event, then why should we not use the consistency of 
their recorded observations to corroborate their accounts and thereby 
establish the reliability of this evidence?   
I, for one, am not particularly concerned about the possibility that 
such data would be the product of fabrication.  It is, of course, possi-
ble that individuals who have no other ties and are located in various 
parts of the country could conspire to fabricate evidence on a given 
occasion, but that would mean they would have to have prior 
knowledge of the liability-generating event.  If such a scenario were to 
occur—if a group conspired to use social networking to fabricate fa-
vorable evidence admissible under the present sense impression ex-
ception—then it should not be difficult to uncover the plot.  As I 
noted earlier, computer forensic examiners are very skillful at finding 
hidden clues—such as prior, relevant communications or other con-
nections between the conspirators.35 
CONCLUSION 
Looking back at what I have written, I fear I may have given Profes-
sor Bellin a bit of a hard time.  That was definitely not my intention.  I 
found his article thought-provoking, and have taken advantage of this 
opportunity to share some of those thoughts with you.  I think he has 
initiated what will no doubt be an ongoing, highly complex discussion 
of this very important issue.  
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35 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
